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SUMMARY 
While we can generally see a decline of the share of industry, parallel to this trend the Visegrad countries are taking over 
more industrial production (mainly assembly). This will reduce the requirements for innovative knowledge workers. This 
“over-industrialisation” has led to a dual economy, in which domestic companies compete by utilising the comparative 
advantages of a cheaper labour force. In fact, products whose comparative advantages do not decrease as the 
development gap narrows are needed for sustainable economic development. If we continue to hinder the development of 
non-material services this way, then by decreasing innovative capacities we shall get deeper into the trap of dependent 
market economies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For centuries the greatest problem associated with the 
evaluation of Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
economies is that, although these countries follow the 
development of Western European nations in many 
aspects, they never do it effectively enough so that the 
accepted social and economic remedies can resolve their 
most pressing social concerns. As a consequence, a 
political reaction always arises that attacks the Western 
European paradigms and tries to replace them with other 
ones. 
These developmental international arrangements 
always take into account mutual interests, but it can be 
debated whose interests will be best (or better) served. 
There are no clearly established rules in a "win-win" 
situation to determine how much one party gains compared 
to the other. It may happen that such an international 
arrangement causes unforeseen damage to one of the 
party’s interests in the long run. As the results are only 
partially successful, the solutions can always be attacked 
by saying that they serve only the interests of Western 
Europe. 
These unsatisfactorily-resolved social problems will 
lead to discussions, fights, and developmental detours, and 
they are accompanied by significant social loss. The goal 
of this paper is to help to minimise these losses, because in 
the long run the nations of Europe have a common, 
interdependent fate. 
THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES 
OF AN INADEQUATELY THOUGHT 
OUT “WIN-WIN” SITUATION 
If we look at the change in the structure of consumption 
of the European countries, we see a clear decline in the 
shares of traditional sectors (agriculture and industry) and 
an expansion in the share of non-material sectors.1 This 
statement can be amplified by a further important 
observation: these changes in the consumption structure 
are proportional to the economic development level of 
each country. The more developed a country, the more its 
traditional industries shrink, and the greater the role of 
non-material services in its economy. CEE fits naturally 
into this process.  
 
 
1  The actual pattern of consumption and production is shown in Figures F.1 and f.2 in the Appendix 
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If we examine the long-term transformation of the 
production structures in Europe, the picture is not the same 
for each country. The Visegrad countries are taking over 
more and more specific types of industrial production 
(mainly assembly) from the developed European centre. 
Thus, the share of industry in their production structure is 
higher than what their economic development would 
justify. This difference is a consequence of the realisation 
of the comparative advantages in foreign trade. Its 
mechanism is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Decisions that detach the production structure from consumption structure 
with the help of foreign trade 
If there were no foreign trade, then we ought to produce 
what we consume. So the production structures would 
closely fit the consumption structures. This link can be 
loosened by deciding what we are going to produce 
ourselves, and what we would like to import (Boxes 1-2). 
However this decision requires further decisions. It must 
be decided what exports will offset the consumption of 
imports (Boxes 5-6). To produce goods for both 
consumption and export we need capital goods, so we 
should also decide what kind of capital goods we are going 
to produce or import (Boxes 3-4). Only after these 
decisions can we determine the domestic final use (Box 7). 
But the enterprises delivering the products for final use 
will order from other companies, and that multiplies the 
domestic final use, and this intermediate use will require 
additional imports as well (Boxes 8-9). So the domestic 
production of a country is the total of the boxes of the 
upper row and the imports of the country by summation of 
the boxes below. These are the decisions that increase the 
shares of certain sectors in the production structure, while 
others are reduced. 
It is important to note that these decisions are made by 
the state and the companies together. If the state limits or 
bans the import of certain products, then it promotes 
domestic production. In this case the companies mainly 
concentrate on developments where they are allowed to. If 
there is no state intervention, then comparative advantages 
will govern the enterprise decisions. This leads to the 
known general case where, in the more developed, more 
industrialised countries, the production of industry 
exceeds domestic consumption of those products. 
However, it is also true that as economic development 
advances, the share of industry within such a country’s 
production shrinks, and these countries will concentrate 
their domestic activities in ever increasing proportion into 
non-material services. 
This process can be described as classic modernization. 
People increasingly consume IT and business services, 
educational and health services, and sophisticated 
administrative services. These services are often very 
complex in content, and they require significant 
allocations of resources for their production. In addition, 
modern agriculture and industry need scientific services, 
without which their development would halt and their 
effectiveness decrease. All these activities are non-
material services, the increasing share of which we are 
speaking about. 
This process is also going on in Central and Eastern 
Europe, but somewhat distortedly. The share of the 
region's industry is greater than its economic development 
level justifies, and accordingly the share of non-material 
services is less. This process is led by the Czech Republic, 
followed closely by Slovakia and Hungary. 
We should mention that in Hungary a very simplified 
interpretation of what it means to be “productive” has 
recently been revived, according to which only agriculture 
and industry can be regarded as productive. In the history 
of Hungarian economic science, there was a discussion in 
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the 1970s when, in accordance with international 
developments, a different, more modern concept was 
formulated in which anything that generated income was 
designated as productive. Outdated views have been 
revived because the “over-development” of industry had 
to be explained somehow. This word – “over-
development” – is an important concept of study. It does 
not mean that industry should not be developed, but that 
“over-development” must be re-thought. Is it good for the 
Visegrad countries if they raise the proportion of their 
industry significantly higher than is justified by their 
economic development, while the non-material sphere’s 
development is slowed down? Why may the 
“overdevelopment” of industry be a problem? 
Figure 1 shows just how one should define the 
requirements for capital goods in the production process. 
However, for production, headcount is also needed, which 
requires equivalent investment mainly in education and 
healthcare. It can be proved that these human investments 
are less if the share of industry is greater. This is shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The human investment requirements 
of different industries 
Based on the labour and production statistics of 
EUROSTAAT, industries can be divided into three groups 
according to their labour requirements per unit of 
production, both in the developed and in the Visegrad 
countries. 
 To the first group belong the specialised sectors such 
as agriculture, construction, and trade. These are very 
ancient industries where human work has been 
gradually replaced by capital. They mainly require 
labour that is equipped with specific knowledge 
characteristic of these industries. So agricultural 
companies mainly require skilled workers in 
agriculture, trade companies need workers specialised 
in trade, etc. This is illustrated by the single histogram 
which rises at the special education section of the 
horizontal axis. The flat horizontal line indicates that 
there is no significant need for workers from the other 
educational groups. 
 The second group includes the traditional complex 
sectors, for example, industry. All kinds of expertise 
are needed, but the pressure to increase profit by 
increasing productivity forces enterprises to replace 
expensive, highly skilled workers with capital and to 
increase the number of cheap assembly workers whose 
main task is to operate machinery. Over the long term 
this leads to an industrial specialisation with not-too-
high, special vocational educational needs. It can be 
proved statistically that the majority of the people 
employed in the industrial sector are less educated 
skilled workers and assemblers, and there is a tendency 
to outsource the highly educated employees into the 
sector of non-material services. This is illustrated by 
the shape in the middle of Figure 2, where the rhombus 
of highly skilled workers is lower than that of the less 
educated workers. (at the bottom of Figure 2 the arrow 
symbolises falling educational needs). 
 Finally into the third group are classified the emerging 
industries that offer a foundation for renewal. Here the 
employees face complex problems that can be solved 
only by higher and more general knowledge which 
fosters high-level innovation. Here the heights of the 
rhombuses are just the reverse, regardless of whether 
this relates to the Czech Republic or Germany. 
It is logical that new activities always need more work 
and are more knowledge-intensive. Accordingly, the 
process of specialisation requires average skills and 
knowledge. 
Using Leontieff’s open-static input-output model, the 
author made calculations to quantify the impact of 
assembly-type industrial overdevelopment on the required 
human investments. The results are summarised in Figure 
4.  
These computations need rather large data samples and 
intensive processing. From the OECD input-output 
database we take the input-output tables for around 20 
countries. From their “B” type domestic table we deduct 
their domestic final use vectors and their Leontieff inverse 
matrices. With their help, we build the equation 
Q?y? = x? 
for each selected country noted by ?, where ? is HU for 
Hungary, SK for Slovakia, CZ for Czech Republic, PL for 
Poland, FR for France, GE for Germany, AU for Austria, 
and SE for Sweden. In this equation 
Q? = [E-B?<x?>-1]-1, where B? is the matrix of domestic 
intermediate use, 
x? is the vector of production, and 
y? is the vector of domestic final use. 
The equation QHyH = xH demonstrates the computation 
of xH, the Hungarian production vector, as a function of 
yH, the Hungarian domestic final use vector. 
In the next step, from the domestic final use vector of 
each selected county we calculate a modified domestic 
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final use vector whose structure is the same as in the 
original final use vector, but its total is equal to the 
Hungarian final use vector’s total: 
y? = y? (<1’yH> /<1’y?>)  
Then we calculate a production vector as the product 
of the Hungarian Leontieff inverse and the modified 
domestic final use vector in the following way: 
x? = QHy?. 
The result x? shows what would be Hungary’s 
production by sectors if Hungary had the ? selected 
country’s domestic final use structure. 
Then we take the matrix FH of Hungarian employment, 
having an ISCO x INDUSTRY structure, whose ij-element 
shows how much labour is needed for the production of 
industry j with the qualification i. But this data does not 
reflect well the human investment requirements, because 
they are expressed merely in the numbers of persons. It 
does not take into account that a highly skilled worker 
studies on average 15 and a half years, while an assembler 
only 10.3 years (See Figure 3). 
Therefore, from the FH employment matrix we create 
a TH knowledge matrix by multiplying each row of FH by 
the average number of years people should spend in study 
to get the appropriate ISCO classification. So TH is an 
ISCO x INDUSTRY matrix whose ij-element shows that 
for the production of industry j how many years should be 
spent in different schools to get the ISCO classification i. 
This way the headcount requirements are modified to 
better express the necessary investment in education.  
 
Source: Lakatos 2015 
Figure 3. Schooling structure in different occupations 
Then we determine the  
T?x? 
product which shows how Hungary’s learning demands 
(practically equivalent to knowledge demands) would 
evolve if Hungary had the domestic final use of country ?. 
The results are shown in Figure 4. The HU HU values 
show the actual Hungarian data. The CZ HU values 
indicate that Hungary could have the same output with less 
knowledge if it took the Czech domestic final use 
structure. However, if Hungary would approach the 
domestic final use structure of the more developed 
countries, then the country could get into trouble, because 
more knowledge would be required.  
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Figure 4. Knowledge requirements of Hungarian employment in case of takeover 
of the domestic final use structure of some selected developed countries 
The number of assemblers on the Slovak and Czech 
paths would not decrease, however, in all other cases it 
would. Fewer highly skilled people would be required in 
the case of “over-industrialisation,” while significantly 
more would be necessary if we follow the developed 
countries. Otherwise, the results of calculations can be 
understood even without input-output modelling. If the 
weight of industry in domestic final use is reduced, and the 
weight of non-material services is increased, then demand 
would increase for occupations which are necessary for the 
new types of activities. Vice versa: assembly type industry 
overdevelopment can reduce the requirements for highly 
educated, innovative knowledge workers. Of course it is a 
question whether this is good in the long run. It may prove 
to be a trap. Hereinafter I would like to investigate this 
issue on the micro level as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE REALISATION OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES 
AND THE REDUCTION OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT GAP 
If the CEE countries „over-develop," then it cannot be 
dismissed as a small problem. Complicated processes lead 
to this unfortunate outcome. These countries have 
democratic social systems. During the overdevelopment 
process, several governments succeeded each other in 
power. Obvious errors would have been easily eliminated 
by succeeding governments. There must be deeper causes 
if multiple governments support the same processes. Their 
goal must have been to utilize the comparative advantages 
as described by Ricardo. As a result of historical 
developments, during the transition from planned 
economies into market economies, the Central and Eastern 
European countries had one major comparative advantage: 
their medium-skilled, low-wage, but well-educated masses 
of workers. Obviously this had to be for sale if there was 
such a demand. 
A leading Chinese economist, Justin Lifu Yin, named 
this pursuit of comparative advantage as the driving force 
of the renewal of China.2 His views can be demonstrated 
by Figures 5 and 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  See Lin 2012, Demystifying the Chinese Economy, pages 111-122.  
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Figure 5. Selection of technologies with different factor endowments 
Explanation: 
m(1)R – the gradient of technology function of the rich 
country with minus sign;  
m(1)P – the gradient of technology function of the poor 
country with minus sign; 
m(1)R > m(1)P. 
Lin (2012) claims that, at a lower stage of social 
development, producers are poorer and less able to 
accumulate. Richer societies are already advanced in 
accumulation. The enterprises of a rich country employ 
more machines and fewer workers. For them the red line 
represents the optimal technology, which in this example 
will work with 6 units of labour and almost 4 units of 
capital. For the companies of a poorer country, the capital 
is expensive and the labour is cheaper. Obviously they will 
select a technology with less capital and more labour, 
which in our examples requires 9 units of labour and two 
and half units of capital. The technology lines expressing 
their capital-to-labour ratios will touch the isoquant 
representing equal outputs of different capital and labour 
mix at different points. 
This law can be generalised. With more labour 
intensive technology, the poorer country’s poorer 
enterprises can compete with the rich country’s richer 
enterprises. This shows the utilization of comparative 
advantages. 
The theory of comparative advantages, however, deals 
only with factors that explain foreign trade. In his famous 
example, Ricardo explained why less-developed Portugal 
could produce more efficiently by exporting wine to 
England in exchange for imports of textiles, but he did not 
investigate the question of whether the development gap 
would be reduced between the two countries if both 
utilised their comparative advantages. According to Lin, 
however, this is possible if the poorer country’s 
accumulation is quicker than that of the richer country. He 
named this process upgrading the endowment structure, 
which is the continuous and if possible quicker increase of 
the capital equipment of labour, i.e. capital used by one 
unit of labour.  
 
Figure 6. Changes in selection of technologies over time 
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Explanation: 
m(2)R > M(1)R és m(2)P > M(1)P; 
m(2)P/m(1)P > m(2)r/m(1)r  
Figure 6 shows this process of upgrading over time. 
The solid lines represent the technologies of later periods. 
On the one hand, due to the increase in the overall 
efficiency of production factors, the isoquant of production 
shifts upwards; on the other hand, the accumulation of 
profit makes the lines representing technologies "steeper". 
As a result of accumulation, the scarcity of capital will be 
reduced, which reduces the relative price of capital and 
starts the substitution of work by capital. The question is, 
to what extent. 
Since the necessary condition of becoming "steeper" is 
faster accumulation, the upgrading process will lead to a 
reduction in the development gap if, in the less-developed 
countries, the accumulation is faster and more intense. The 
findings of Lin (2012) can be summarised as follows: 
 Empirical facts have proved the futility of development 
strategies that aim directly at upgrading the industrial 
technology structure. 
 So, to upgrade that structure and to ensure maximum 
efficiency, the cause – the factor endowment structure 
– must be changed. 
 Factor endowment refers to an economy’s relative 
abundance in capital, labour, land, and natural 
resources. The major difference comes from capital 
accumulation. So, upgrading the endowment structure 
means increasing the relative abundance of capital. 
 The key to upgrading the factor endowment structure 
of an economy is to increase each period’s surplus 
production and the proportion of surplus accumulated 
as capital. With more surplus, and with a bigger 
proportion of it accumulated as capital, upgrading the 
factor endowment structure is faster. 
 With a given surplus, the rate of capital accumulation 
also hinges on whether people are willing to 
accumulate. 
 Hindrances to this process must be reduced: burdens 
imposed by politics, rent seeking, corruption, etc. 
This collection of statements will be further referred to 
as Lin’s theorem. As a matter of fact, this theorem is not 
new. The logic of Harrod-Domar models, as well as that of 
Solow's production function, is the same. In their view, the 
causes of differences in the development of nations are in 
accumulation: variances in time, size, and efficiency. For 
the time being, let us accept this claim. Later we shall 
return to it, because if we begin to examine what factors 
make the process of accumulation of individual nations 
different, then we have to consider other factors too, like 
knowledge capital (Roamer 1994), institutions 
(Acemoglu, Robinson 2012), historical developments, the 
distribution of income, the ecological environment 
(Stiglitz 2001, Sen 1999), etc. Now let us take a look at 
what the upgrading process looks like.  
Before the statistical quantification of the upgrading 
process, we must examine the measurability of production 
factors. Without that, we cannot examine the capital-to-
labour ratios in their use. Unfortunately, the necessary data 
for other Central and Eastern European countries are not 
available. So we can analyse only the Hungarian upgrading 
process. 
Every year since 2009, Corvinus University of 
Budapest has received from the Hungarian Tax Authority 
the full corporate tax database (with the items made 
anonymous). This database contains the balance sheet and 
profit and loss account of each important enterprise. This 
data is constantly monitored by the state, and therefore this 
is one of the most important and reliable sources of 
national accounts, even though it is not free of errors. From 
this data, one can derive the tangible assets (or total assets) 
of 450,000 Hungarian enterprises along with their average 
number of employees. Simple division gives the first 
approximation of the technical equipment of work, which 
is the tangible capital per employee. 
The use of labour and capital has costs. These costs are 
reported in the lines of the profit and loss accounts and can 
be assigned either to capital or to labour. However, we 
soon run into difficulties if we would like to assign all costs 
reported in the balance sheet to either labour or capital, 
because there is an ever-increasing cost item, that of so-
called “other inputs”, which has ever-increasing number 
of cost elements that cannot be assigned to any of the 
reported production factors. For instance, costs allocated 
for managing bad debts are in the category of customer 
relations, which belongs to neither tangible capital nor 
labour. It belongs to a new capital item: intangible capital. 
The same is true for advertising expenses, or for non-wage 
expenditures dedicated to organisational development. 
This raises the question of how much, in fact, is the capital 
and what does it consist of? Is it equal to the tangible 
capital reported in the balance sheet, or is it more than that? 
This question must be answered if we want to calculate the 
technical equipment of work. Among other things, these 
considerations lead to a Roamer-type production function 
(Figure 7), which expands the traditional Cobb Douglas 
production function by the intangible factors of 
production. 
If we accept this production function, then the concept 
of capital expands. There will be both tangible and 
intangible capital. The company’s capital will be equal to 
the T + I1E + I1I part in the left box in Figure 7. In our 
study, this sum will be denoted by E. Remember that the 
I2 elements are not part of E. The I2 elements are part of 
the human capital, H, and will never belong to the 
company. They can only be leased by the company and are 
strictly connected to labour. In this case, however, besides 
the technological lines touching the isoquant, new 
technological lines will appear. More specifically, the area 
they cover will be divided into two parts, as shown in 
Figure 8. The area under the dashed line represents the 
tangible technical equipment of work, while the area 
between the dashed line and the solid line represents the 
intangible technical equipment of labour.  
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Figure 7. The extension of the Cobb-Douglas type production function 
with the elements intangible capital 
 
 
Figure 8. The tangible and intangible technical equipment of labour 
Explanation: 
mTR and mTP – Tangible technological equipment of rich 
and poor countries, respectively; 
mIR and mIP – Intangible technological equipment of rich 
and poor countries; 
As development proceeds, mIR will slowly increase and 
exceed mTR-t, and mIP also will gradually surpass mTP-
t. This supposes that, during upgrading, the gap should be 
reduced not only in tangible technological equipment but 
also in intangible technological equipment. 
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At this point the definition of technical equipment must 
be more generally discussed. Since the concept of capital 
has been expanded, and since the interpretation of the 
volume of immaterial enterprise assets is somewhat 
unambiguous, from now on, we will interpret technical 
equipment of labour to be the ratio of total capital costs to 
total labour costs. Since the numerator can be divided into 
three elements, we differentiate tangible, intangible, and 
total technical equipment. 
There is no production factor without its accompanying 
cost. The cost is equal to some sacrifice of the production 
factors. Therefore, the costs should be proportionate to the 
usage of the factors of production. The balance sheet does 
not measure the enterprise’s total capital because it does 
not contain intangible production factors. It does, however, 
report the total costs. If we assign all labour-related cost to 
labour, then the remaining costs are proportionate to E, the 
enterprise’s capital. So, from the costs assigned to 
enterprise capital, we can estimate the value of the 
enterprise’s capital. 
Before the quantification, we simplify the production 
function of Figure 7: 
Y = cTT + cLL + cII 
where 
 Y = Value added 
 T = Visible/tangible assets (simply the balance sheet 
total) 
 L = Number of employees 
 I = Immaterial (or knowledge) assets additionally 
invested by the enterprise: business development, 
customer retention, organizational efficiency, etc. 
 cT = unit cost of the usage of T, visible/tangible assets, 
 cL = unit cost of the usage of L, employees and their 
personal knowledge, skills, and motivation 
 cI = unit cost of the usage of I, immaterial and 
knowledge assets. 
The equation relies on the following economic 
considerations: 
 A company can produce new value only by using its 
assets. 
 Beyond the visible/tangible assets and the employees 
involved in production, additional invisible, 
immaterial/intangible assets must be used. These 
include the following: 
 The personal knowledge of employees (IK), their 
skills (IS) and motivation (IM). These three make up 
the human assets (H) bound to L.  
 Further immaterial assets, such as client assets 
needed to acquire and retain customers and 
suppliers (IE), and organisational assets in the form 
of know-how, knowledge base, and organisation 
(II). These assets increase the invested enterprise 
assets (E). 
 The use of assets requires costs (depreciation, wages, 
advertising, customer retention, business development, 
knowledge base and know-how development, training, 
etc.). 
 If the entrepreneur incorporates his profit expectations 
into his costs, then sustainable production has one 
precondition: the produced value added must cover 
the costs of the production factors. 
In the equation Y = cTT + cLL + cII, only cI and I are 
unknown. If we estimate cI, then I can be calculated in the 
following way: 
I = (Y - cTT - cLL)/cI = cII/cI 
In our calculations, we assume that revenue 
expectations of the much riskier immaterial investments 
(increased by profit expectations) are twice as big as the 
revenue expectations of the visible/tangible investments 
(cI = 2cT). In this way, we can quantify the aggregate 
production functions of each enterprise group in the 
Hungarian economy. One part of these is presented in 
Table 1. 
The production functions in Table 1 reveal much about 
the general operation of enterprises in Hungary. Thorough 
analysis could go far beyond the scope of this article. 
However, in this study we focus on only one question: 
What is the connection between efficiency and the 
technical equipment of labour? 
Based on data in production functions (see the last 
column in Table 1), it is clear that “over-industrialisation” 
has led to a dual economy in Hungary: 
 Half of the GDP is produced by foreign companies that 
are more efficient than the domestic private companies. 
The value added per enterprise or the value added per 
employee in foreign companies is much higher than 
that of domestic companies.3 
 The same is true even if the companies are grouped 
according to size. Foreign companies are more 
effective than domestic enterprises in both the group of 
companies employing more than 20 people and the 
group employing fewer than 20. 
 The law of return to scale appears in that the efficiency 
of Hungarian enterprises employing more than 20 
people is greater than that of those which employ fewer 
than 20.4 
 
 
 
 
 
3  The per capita efficiency differences see in the F.2.1 appendix table. 
4  This statement is not valid for foreign companies. In that enterprise group, the per capita added value of small businesses is greater than that of the 
large ones. This suggests that small businesses in this group are not real small businesses. Behind them stands a large parent. 
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Table 1 
The production functions of enterprises submitting tax declarations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Corporate tax database of the National Tax and Customs Authority. The “enterprises altogether” in row 1 contains 
state-owned enterprises as well. 
The differences in the average use of capital and labour 
of Hungarian private and foreign enterprises are so large 
that Hungarian figures are barely visible in a common 
coordinate system. Therefore the relevant part of Figure 9 
has been magnified. The relations can, however, be easily 
seen from the gradients.  
 In the most effective foreign-owned companies, the 
technical equipment of labour is higher (their line is 
steeper, with a gradient of 1.4). In the Hungarian 
private companies, the technical equipment of work is 
smaller (their line is less steep, with a gradient of 0.72).  
 The ratio of intangible technical equipment to the 
tangible technical equipment of labour is better in the 
foreign enterprises. In foreign companies, -m(T+I)/-
mT = 1.4 / 0.68 = 2.06. In Hungarian domestic 
companies, -m(T+I)/-mT = 0.72/0.37 = 1.95).  
So we have shown that there is a close relationship 
between efficiency and the technical equipment of work.  
 
Figure 9. Technical equipment of the observed enterprise groups in 2009 
  
0
50
100
150
200
250
CT
 o
r C
T+
CI
CL
Average enterprise - Enterprisees altogether - Mill. FT. -
2009
Foreign enterprises (-mT =
0,68)
Foreign enterprises (-
m(T+I) = 1,4)
Hungarian private
enterprises (-mT = 0,37)
Hungarian private
enterprises (-m(T+I) =
0,72)0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 5 10 15
t N cT T cL L cI I Y cT 1000*T/N cL 1000*L/N cI 1000*I/N 1000*Y/N
Year
Number 
of 
enterpris
es
Cost of 
usage of 
tangible 
assets
Tangible 
assets
Cost of 
usage of 
labour
Labour
Cost of 
usage of 
customer 
and 
organizat
ional 
assets
Custome
r and 
organizat
ional 
assets
Added 
value
Cost of 
usage of 
tangible 
assets
Tangible 
assets 
per 
company 
(HUF 
Mill./ent
erprise)
Cost of 
usage of 
labour
Labour 
force per 
enterpris
e 
(person/
enterpris
e)
Cost of 
usage of 
customer 
and 
organizat
ional 
assets
Custome
r and 
organisat
ional 
assets 
per 
company 
(HUF 
Mill./ent
erprise)
Added 
value per 
enterpris
e (HUF 
Mill./ent
erprise)
Year Piece HUF/HUF HUF Bn. Mill HUF / person
Thousan
d 
persons
HUF/HUF HUF Bn. HUF Bn. HUF/HUF
Mill.HUF/
enterpris
e
Mill HUF 
/ person Person HUF/HUF
Mill.HUF/
enterpris
e
Mill.HUF/
enterpris
e
1 Enterprisees altogether
2 Enterprisees altogether 2009 385 723 0,03 155 464 4,2 2 339 0,06 80 718 19 828 0,03 403 4,2 6 0,06 209 51
3 2014 422 760 0,03 161 284 5,2 2 313 0,05 126 160 23 547 0,03 382 5,2 5 0,05 298 56
4 Foreign enterprises 2009 27 400 0,03 101 587 7,4 624 0,06 54 118 10 980 0,03 3 708 7,4 23 0,06 1 975 401
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Figure 10. Technical equipment of enterprises employing more than 20 persons, and then fewer than 20 
In foreign companies, whether large or small, the work 
is technically more equipped than in Hungarian companies 
(Figure 10). However, domestic private enterprises have 
the same technical equipment of labour, independent of 
size. 
It is very important to note how these differences have 
changed over time, i.e., whether there was upgrading or 
not. This is presented in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Change in the technical equipment of observed enterprises between 2009 and 2014 
Figure 11 is technically difficult to understand because 
of differences in magnitude. For this reason, a separate part 
of the figure—the lines of Hungarian domestic 
companies—had to be magnified. A few words about the 
markings: The solid lines show the values of the year 2014, 
while the dashed lines indicate the 2009 values. The 
thicker lines represent the E values, the thinner ones the T 
values. Red lines indicate the values of foreign companies, 
while the green ones belong to the Hungarian domestic 
companies. To help the processing of the figures, the 
quotients are given in a separate table which briefly 
summarises the upgrading process. 
For our chain of thought it is important to note that, 
after the crisis, the foreign companies upgraded only their 
intangible capital (in the form of maintaining their 
customer base and their organisation.) Their amortisation 
decreased by 10 percent, and their investment services 
activities halved. This suggests that, even if they have 
difficulties at home, they at least take care of maintenance 
in the assembler countries. 
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It is essential to notice that among Hungarian 
companies only the bigger firms – employing more than 
20 people - could successfully upgrade. The favourable 
technical equipment of work in smaller enterprises has 
deteriorated compared to that of bigger ones.5 
Overall, the Lin theorem partially works: 
1. The technical equipment of work in the more efficient 
companies is bigger. 
2. Also, the intangible technical equipment is bigger in 
the more efficient companies. 
3. Hungarian domestic companies compete by utilizing 
the comparative advantages of a cheaper labour force. 
So they struggle with the higher capital potential of 
multinational companies. 
4. Analysing the changes over time, we can say that, after 
the crisis, the foreign enterprises did not make 
developments at the former pace. In general, they sat 
on the fence. 
5. The Hungarian domestic companies developed 
cautiously. 
6. Points 1-5 describe a situation in Hungary which can 
be considered as only a temporary upgrading compared 
to the foreign enterprises, because it will immediately 
vanish when the developed countries finish their 
renewal and begin to transfer their outsourced 
technologies into the assembler countries. 
7. This indicates that the assembler countries represent an 
additional reservoir next to the great pot of developed 
countries. If the soup overflows the big pot, then it will 
fall into the neighbouring little pots. There is no policy 
which coordinates the total amount of soup distributed 
among the pots. 
Regarding the computations, we should call attention 
to several cautionary aspects: 
1. Measurements at current prices reflect the upgrading 
process in a peculiar way. 
a. The increase in labour costs was accompanied only 
by minor growth in employment. 
b. Inflation is included in the cost increments and 
must be accounted for. 
c. In fact, the upgrading was small or stagnant. This is 
particularly important in the case of foreign 
companies, whose “degrading” is not actual, but 
only relative. They have maintained their earlier 
investments, and have made no intentional changes 
in their technical equipment of labour. They have 
increased wages to keep their positions in the 
labour market. We still have a lot to do before we 
can make a final evaluation of the upgrading 
process in Hungary. 
2. The Central Statistical Office of Hungary significantly 
corrects the corporate tax declaration data at a higher 
level of aggregation. These corrections should be 
derived at the enterprise level if we would like the 
enterprise database to be more reliable. This requires 
further data processing. However, the Murai study and 
the GNI report (KSH 2009) of the Hungarian CSO6 
indicate that the above computations give a reliable 
picture of the production functions of the Hungarian 
economy since this database is one of the most 
important sources used by CSO to compile national 
accounts. 
STRATEGIC DILEMMAS 
The realisation of comparative advantages so far 
discussed, however, raises a series of questions. Let us go 
back once again to Ricardo. It is not a coincidence that 
Ricardo, when investigating the law of comparative 
advantages, used an example of two countries, each of 
which had advantageous conditions for producing its own 
distinct product, and the two countries could exchange 
these products. He does not speak about a case where two 
countries produce the same product, with one having a 
comparative advantage over the other in production of that 
product. Wine and textiles may make their respective 
producing countries rich, and the corresponding 
comparative advantages will persist even if the two 
countries get to the same level of development. But the 
labour market does not work that way. If development 
levels equalise, the comparative advantage of labour 
disappears; it lasts only as long as development levels 
remain different. It follows that, if we want to reduce the 
differences in development, we need to find a product 
different from labour whose comparative advantages do 
not decrease as the development gap narrows. 
Such a product does not appear overnight, just as 
textiles and wine do not magically turn up on our 
doorsteps. This problem requires strategic thinking, 
actions and projects according to a plan, and a processes of 
trial and error. 
First of all, the Lin theorem must be extended. 
Upgrading is not satisfactory if it only takes up the 
assembling technology and outsourced production of the 
more developed countries. Finding the future carrier 
product should not start when the follower catches up to 
the frontrunner, but far earlier. Nokia and Samsung were 
not created after Finland and Korea significantly increased 
the GDP per capita; on the contrary, their creation caused 
the increase. The upgrading is not fully achieved simply 
by increasing the technical equipment of labour. We must 
 
 
 
 
5  See Table F.1 in the Appendix. 
6  See Murai and the CSO GNI report. 
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also renew the product portfolio with innovative, future 
carrier products. The development of China and South 
Korea show different examples. China rewards 
manufacturers when they upgrade, whether or not they 
export. In South Korea manufacturers get support only if 
the resulting product is exported. The latter is the really 
good example to follow.  
This exportation of carrier products is the only way to 
escape the trap of relative wage and knowledge decrease. 
It leads to productivity growth in certain areas (i.e. those 
related to the new carrier products) and creates the 
conditions for wage increases. Of course it will drain 
manpower from elsewhere, and this induces wage 
increases in the traditional areas as well. This will diminish 
the low-wage-based comparative advantages in the general 
economy, which results in a loss of competitiveness and 
expels from the market producers who are unable to 
change. But it does not matter. The advances made in the 
competitive areas will compensate for it. 
If we continue the overdevelopment of industry with 
assembly content and thus hinder the development of non-
material services, then we will only decrease the 
innovative capacity of the country, and then we shall get 
deeper into the trap that Soskice, Nölke and Vligenhart call 
the DME model.7 According to their classifications, they 
differentiate three types of capitalism relating to Central 
and Eastern European countries: 
 LME = Liberal Market Economy (USA, UK) 
 CME = Corporate Market Economy (Germany, 
Austria) 
 DME = Dependent Market Economy (Visegrad 
countries) 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Hungary is now firmly in the DME category. 
According to Nölke and Vliegenhart, the dependency 
appears in the following areas: 
1. Dependence on the most important investment 
resource 
The decisions defining economic growth are not made 
in DME countries. They are made in those 
headquarters where the FDI is coming from: Western 
Europe and the USA. 
2. Pressure to follow the operation model of the biggest 
investors 
The most important corporate decisions are made not 
by local managers and shareholders, but by the local 
managers and the western corporate centres. This 
significantly affects the domestically owned small and 
medium-sized companies, because they are basically 
dependent. 
3. Effect on the cooperation of social partners 
A typical phenomenon is the system of enterprise-level 
agreements that is widespread in Central and Eastern 
Europe, while in Western Europe the majority of 
agreements are made at the sectoral and national level. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, the system of social 
expenditures is not the result of unfolding social 
struggles involving the masses, but it is evolving rather 
on a selective basis through the appeasement of 
employees of multinational companies. 
4. Effect on education and training systems 
The transnational companies require a relatively cheap 
labour force with intermediate-level technical skills 
because it yields the comparative advantage of the 
DME system. For this reason, it is not in the interests 
of the transnational corporations to invest in the 
potential for innovation, because they would prefer to 
bring their own innovation in from abroad. In addition, 
limited local innovation does not require an education 
system that provides general abilities based on 
significant R&D expenditures. Multinationals also do 
not require flexible labour markets like those in their 
home countries. It is sufficient for them to have a 
moderately flexible workforce, as this avoids major 
labour movements and prevents disturbances in the 
assembly plants’ operations. 
The decline in educational investment, to which the 
governments are forced for a number of reasons, does 
not foster or maintain a strong public education system 
that could (if enabled) augment the limited vocational 
training with an Anglo-Saxon type high standard 
education that provides a high general knowledge 
level. This decline erodes the comparative advantages 
themselves. While Hungarian enterprises are worried 
about these processes and demand to reverse them, the 
Western enterprise centres are not very interested in 
these trends, because they can move their production 
elsewhere at any time if the local skill levels degrade 
too much. 
5. Effect on innovation processes 
Transnational enterprises concentrate their innovation-
intensive activities at headquarters, which they then 
disseminate within their own enterprise systems. To 
the DME countries they delegate the role of 
assembler—based on the innovations developed at 
home. All this creates possibilities to utilise just a 
special type of comparative advantage. 
We cannot say that there is no innovation in Central 
and Eastern Europe, or that the region produces only 
outdated products. On the contrary! The comparative 
advantage of the region is based precisely on their 
ability to adapt quickly to new trends in the production 
of durable quality goods. Still, most of the new trends 
come into the region from outside. The number of 
innovations developed in Central and Eastern Europe 
is small, and they appear mostly among supplier 
companies of the biggest multinationals.  
 
7  See Nölke and Vliegnhardt (2009). 
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6. Effect on society as a whole 
While the DME model is very coherent and has proven 
very successful in certain sectors, it has clearly failed 
in raising the standard of living of the general 
population. Instead, we can observe a growing dualism 
in these societies, with widening income disparities 
between those who are part of the export-oriented 
sectors and those who are excluded, plus others who 
have to bear the financial burdens of incentives offered 
abundantly by governments who continually try to 
attract foreign investments. This uneven development 
has led to increasing political populism and social 
tensions in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The points mentioned above were written in 2009 and 
unfortunately have proved to be prophetic. Given this 
situation, the following potential policy options 
emerge: 
1) Complete adaptation to the addiction 
a. This course of action is very dangerous. It would 
not solve the problems of these societies, because 
that is not the intent of the power centres who have 
created the addiction (the LMD-CME countries). It 
would split these societies into “haves” and “have-
nots.” Those who are left behind—while generating 
substantial costs of deviation—will not be able to 
participate effectively in building up the country. 
b. In case of crises, social problems would 
immediately rise to the surface, since at such times 
the LMD-CME countries concentrate their 
resources at home to solve their own problems. 
This is easily seen in the analysis above. During the 
crisis of 2008, foreign companies had only a limited 
upgrading. 
c. There is a danger that the whole region might be 
devalued if better investment opportunities appear 
elsewhere. 
d. It surrenders self-determination. 
2) Getting rid of the addiction 
a. This would be ridiculously expensive. 
b. It would trigger the resistance of the LME-DME 
countries. 
c. It delivers us into the hands of less progressive 
countries. 
3) Integration into the array of core countries by 
utilising the comparative advantages of the dependency 
(the Irish example). 
a. This is the only reasonable alternative. 
b. It would require the allocation of additional social 
investments which would have only domestic 
sources of support. 
Those who want change must create the material 
conditions for that change. The difficulty is that 
already the people have frequently been asked to 
make sacrifices, and these have been wasted or 
misused; therefore, such efforts stir up deep 
mistrust of the authorities. But the problem must be 
solved. If there is no change, there cannot be 
improvement.  
The opportunities that might yield quickly visible 
results lie in the way of “low hanging fruit.” 
Unfortunately, there are relatively few such 
options. Traditional methods of raising sufficient 
revenue take a long time, and they usually gain 
popular support only when social tensions are 
already dangerously strained.  
Renewal relies only on national productive forces. 
I deliberately avoid using the word domestic, since 
a major part of “domestic” production forces are 
owned by foreigners. 
The real latent resource of the Hungarian economy 
could be found in a “reconcentration” program that 
would strengthen small and medium-sized 
enterprises.8 This would bring quick and visible 
social impacts in both income and employment, and 
it could also gain social support.  
The production calculations of this study indicate 
that greater efficiency can be expected only if there 
is a greater ability to accumulate national capital. 
To strengthen small and medium enterprises, it is 
necessary to maximize the ability of the middle 
classes to accumulate.  
This is possible only on a meritocratic basis. At 
present, the relevant social doubts are significant 
and justified. 
c. The process should be supported by state 
intervention to provide productive work to those 
who lag behind but are still able to work. 
d. We have to gain the support of LME and CME 
countries, since our integration of this kind is also 
in their long-term interests. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarise, the priorities to be followed in all three 
cases listed above, are the following: 
a. There should be investment in education by optimising 
the distribution of general, vocational, secondary, and 
higher education in order to maximally develop our 
ability to innovate. 
 
 
 
 
8  This is a complex process that is described in a separate study. See the author’s conference paper written for the AIB-CEE Conference in Warsaw 
(2015) under the title Job prospects at the periphery of the European Union (manuscript). 
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b. If we are purposefully looking for sustainable 
comparative advantages, then some new areas should 
be selected. They will require high-level R&D 
activities which must be based on the development of 
the non-material sphere and by the development of 
enterprises that can produce sellable products from 
these R&D results. 
c. The creation of favourable conditions for further 
foreign investments will remain an important priority. 
d. Governments should develop policies that lead to every 
employable citizen working productively to contribute 
materially to building the country. 
Hungary’s shift into the DME category of nations 
exacerbated the transformation crisis, but it also slowed the 
pace of economic growth. Our task is to correct this 
situation by implementing a coherent system of public 
actions. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure F.1. 
 
Figure F.2. 
 
Table F.1 
Differences among enterprises based on value added per enterprise, or per capita value 
added according to enterprise categories 
 
Source: Table 1 of the study 
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Term. Szolg
Építőipar
Ipar
Agrárium
Added value 
per 
enterprise 
(HUF 
Mill./enterpr
ise)
Per capita 
value added 
(Mill. HUF/ 
person)
Tangible 
capital 
equipment
Intangible 
capital 
equipment
Total capital 
equipment
Added value 
per 
enterprise 
(HUF 
Mill./enterpr
ise)
Per capita 
value added 
(Mill. HUF/ 
person)
Tangible 
capital 
equipment
Intangible 
capital 
equipment
Total capital 
equipment
Enterprisees altogether
Foreign enterprises 401 17,6 0,67 0,72 1,39 470 18,9 0,68 1,04 0,87
Hungarian private 
enterprises 21 5,1 0,36 0,35 0,71 27 7,0 1,10 1,17 1,13
Enterprises with more than 20 employees
Foreign enterprises 3 383 16,8 0,61 0,70 1,31 3 806 18,1 0,69 1,00 0,86
Hungarian private 
enterprises 452 6,4 0,35 0,37 0,71 653 9,3 1,27 1,24 1,26
Enterprises with less than 20 employees
Foreign enterprises 58 25,9 1,23 0,97 2,20 63 28,1 0,71 1,36 1,00
Hungarian private 
enterprises 8 3,8 0,39 0,33 0,72 10 4,9 0,85 1,05 0,94
2009 2014
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